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concludes that the new governance structure – the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
which is intended to be successor starting in 2013 of the European Financial Stability 
Mechanism (EFSF), created in May 2010 – does not sufficiently recognize this fragility. Some 
of the features of the new financial assistance are likely to increase this fragility. In addition, 
it is also likely to present member countries from using the automatic stabilizers during a 
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The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone 
CEPS Working Document No. 346/ May 2011 
Paul De Grauwe 
Introduction 
In order to design the appropriate governance institutions for the eurozone it is important to 
make the right diagnosis of the nature of the debt crisis in the eurozone. Failure to do so, can 
lead to designing a governance structure that is inappropriate for dealing with the problems 
of the eurozone. In this paper I argue that the governance structure that has emerged after a 
series of decisions of successive European Council meetings, although an important step 
forwards, fails to address some fundamental problems in a monetary union. 
1.  A Paradox 
I start with the paradox that is immediately visible from a comparison of Figures 1 and 2. 
Figure 1 shows the debt to GDP ratios of the UK and Spain. It can be seen that since the start 
of the financial crisis the government debt ratio of the UK has increased more than that of 
Spain. As a result, in 2011 as a percent of GDP the UK government debt stood 17% higher 
than the Spanish Government debt (89% versus 72%). Yet from Figure 2 it appears that the 
financial markets have singled out Spain and not the UK as the country that could get 
entangled in a government debt crisis. This can be seen from the fact that since the start of 
2010 the yield on Spanish government bonds has increased strongly relative to the UK, 
suggesting that the markets price in a significantly higher default risk on Spanish than on 
UK government bonds. In early 2011 this difference amounted to 200 basis points. Why is it 
that financial markets attach a much higher default risk on Spanish than on UK government 
bonds government bonds, while it appears that the UK faces a less favourable sovereign debt 
and deficit dynamics? 
Figure 1. Gross government debt (% of GDP) 
 
Source: European Commission, Ameco. 
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One possible answer is that it may have something to do with the banking sector. This is 
unconvincing, though. The state of the UK banking sector is certainly not much better than 
the one of Spain. I will argue that this difference in the evaluation of the sovereign default 
risks is related to the fact that Spain belongs to a monetary union, while the UK is not part of 
a monetary union, and therefore has control over the currency in which it issues its debt. 
Figure 2. 10-year government bond rates Spain and UK  
 
Source: Datastream. 
2.  On the nature of sovereign debt in a monetary union 
In a nutshell the difference in the nature of sovereign debt between members and non-
members of a monetary union boils down to the following. Members of a monetary union 
issue debt in a currency over which they have no control. It follows that financial markets 
acquire the power to force default on these countries. This is not the case in countries that are 
not part of a monetary union, and have kept control over the currency in which they issue 
debt. These countries cannot easily be forced into default by financial markets. 
Let me expand on this by considering in detail what happens when investors start having 
doubts about the solvency of these two types of countries. I will use the UK as a prototype 
monetary “stand-alone” country and Spain as a prototype member-country of a monetary 
union (see Kopf, 2011) for an insightful analysis). 
The UK scenario 
Let’s first trace what would happen if investors were to fear that the UK government might 
be defaulting on its debt. In that case, they would sell their UK government bonds, driving 
up the interest rate. After selling these bonds, these investors would have pounds that most 
probably they would want to get rid of by selling them in the foreign exchange market. The 
price of the pound would drop until somebody else would be willing to buy these pounds. 
The effect of this mechanism is that the pounds would remain bottled up in the UK money 
market to be invested in UK assets. Put differently, the UK money stock would remain 
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unchanged. Part of that stock of money would probably be re-invested in UK government 
securities. But even if that were not the case so that the UK government cannot find the 
funds to roll over its debt at reasonable interest rates, it would certainly force the Bank of 
England to buy up the government securities. Thus the UK government is ensured that the 
liquidity is around to fund its debt. This means that investors cannot precipitate a liquidity 
crisis in the UK that could force the UK government into default. There is a superior force of 
last resort, the Bank of England.  
The Spanish scenario 
Things are dramatically different for a member of a monetary union, like Spain. Suppose that 
investors fear a default by the Spanish government. As a result, they sell Spanish 
government bonds, raising the interest rate. So far, we have the same effects as in the case of 
the UK. The rest is very different. The investors who have acquired euros are likely to decide 
to invest these euros elsewhere, say in German government bonds. As a result, the euros 
leave the Spanish banking system. There is no foreign exchange market, nor a flexible 
exchange rate to stop this. Thus the total amount of liquidity (money supply) in Spain 
shrinks. The Spanish government experiences a liquidity crisis, i.e. it cannot obtain funds to 
roll over its debt at reasonable interest rates. In addition, the Spanish government cannot 
force the Bank of Spain to buy government debt. The ECB can provide all the liquidity of the 
world, but the Spanish government does not control that institution. The liquidity crisis, if 
strong enough, can force the Spanish government into default. Financial markets know this 
and will test the Spanish government when budget deficits deteriorate. Thus, in a monetary 
union, financial markets acquire tremendous power and can force any member country on 
its knees. 
The situation of Spain is reminiscent of the situation of emerging economies that have to 
borrow in a foreign currency. These emerging economies face the same problem, i.e. they can 
suddenly be confronted with a “sudden stop” when capital inflows suddenly stop leading to 
a liquidity crisis (see Calvo et al., 2006). 
There is an additional difference in the debt dynamics imposed by financial markets on 
member and non-member countries of a monetary union. In the UK scenario we have seen 
that as investors sell the proceeds of their bond sales in the foreign exchange market, the 
national currency depreciates. This means that the UK economy is given a boost and that UK 
inflation increases. This mechanism is absent in the Spanish scenario. The proceeds of the 
bond sales in Spain leave the Spanish money market without changing any relative price.  
In Figure 3 and 4 I show how this difference has probably affected GDP growth and inflation 
in the UK and Spain since the start of the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. It can be seen 
that since 2010 inflation is almost twice as high in the UK than in Spain (2.9% versus 1.6%). 
In addition the yearly growth of GDP in the UK averages 2% since 2010 against only 0.2% in 
Spain. This is certainly not unrelated to the fact that since the start of the financial crisis the 
pound has depreciated by approximately 25% against the euro. 
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Figure 3
Figure 4
Source: E
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UK will continue to face the long-term interest rates that the markets have imposed since the 
last 6 months (on average 3.5% in the UK and 5% in Spain). Applying the average nominal 
growth rates since 2010 (4.9% in the UK and 1.8% in Spain) we can see that in the UK there is 
no need to generate a primary surplus in order to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio (and 
assuming these growth rates will be maintained). In Spain the primary surplus must be more 
than 2% to achieve this result. Thus, Spain is forced to apply much more austerity than the 
UK to satisfy the solvency condition. Put differently, Spain could not get away with the UK 
budgetary policy without being branded as insolvent despite the fact that it has a 
substantially lower debt level.  
Table 1. Primary surplus needed to stabilize debt at 2011 level (percent of GDP) 
UK -1.21 
Spain 2.30 
 
The previous analysis illustrates an important potentially destructive dynamics in a 
monetary union. Members of a monetary union are very susceptible to liquidity movements. 
When investors fear some payment difficulty (e.g. triggered by a recession that leads to an 
increase in the government budget deficit), liquidity is withdrawn from the national market 
(a ‘sudden stop’). This can set in motion a devilish interaction between liquidity and 
solvency crises. Once a member country gets entangled in a liquidity crisis, interest rates are 
pushed up. Thus the liquidity crisis turns into a solvency crisis. Investors can then claim that 
it was right to pull out the money from a particular national market. It is a self-fulfilling 
prophecy: the country has become insolvent because investors fear insolvency.  
Note that I am not arguing that all solvency problems in the eurozone are of this nature. In 
the case of Greece, for example, one can argue that the Greek government was insolvent 
before investors made their moves and triggered a liquidity crisis in May 2010. What I am 
arguing is that, in a monetary union, countries become vulnerable to self-fulfilling 
movements of distrust that set in motion a devilish interaction between liquidity and 
solvency crises.  
This interaction between liquidity and solvency is avoided in the “stand-alone” country, 
where the liquidity is bottled up in the national money markets (there is no “sudden stop”), 
and where attempts to export it to other markets sets in motion an equilibrating mechanism, 
produced by the depreciation of the currency. Thus, paradoxically, distrust leads to and 
equilibrating mechanism in the UK, and to a potentially disequilibrating mechanism in 
Spain.  
From the preceding analysis, it follows that financial markets acquire great power in a 
monetary union. Will this power be beneficial for the union?  
Believers in market efficiency have been telling us that this power is salutary, as it will act as 
a disciplining force on bad governments. I have lost much of my faith in the idea that 
financial markets are a disciplining force. The financial crisis has made abundantly clear that 
financial markets are often driven by extreme sentiments of either euphoria or panic. During 
periods of euphoria investors, cheered by rating agencies, collectively fail to see the risks and 
take on too much of it. After the crash, fear dominates, leading investors, prodded by rating 
agencies, to detect risks everywhere triggering panic sales much of the time.  6 |  PAUL DE GRAUWE 
 
3.  Multiple equilibria 
The inherent volatility of financial markets leads to another fundamental problem. It can 
give rise to multiple equilibria, some of them good ones; others bad ones. This arises from 
the self-fulfilling nature of market expectations. In appendix, I present a simple theoretical 
model showing more formally how multiple equilibria can arise.  
Suppose markets trust government A. Investors then will show a willingness to buy 
government bonds at a low interest rate. A low interest rate embodies a belief that the 
default risk is low. But the same low interest rate also has the effect of producing a low risk 
of default. This is made very clear from our solvency calculations in Table 1. Markets trust 
that the UK government will not default (despite its having a high debt ratio). As a result, 
the UK government enjoys a low interest rate. Our solvency calculation then shows that 
indeed the UK government is very solvent. Financial markets gently guide the UK towards a 
good equilibrium.  
Suppose market distrusts government B. As a result, investors sell the government bonds. 
The ensuing increase in the interest rate embeds the belief that there is a default risk. At the 
same time this high interest rate actually makes default more likely. Thus in our calculation 
from table 1 it appears that the market’s distrust in the Spanish government in a self-
fulfilling way has made default more likely. Financial markets push Spain towards a bad 
equilibrium.  
The occurrence of bad equilibria is more likely with members of a monetary union, which 
have no control of the currency in which they issue their debt, than with stand-alone 
countries that have issued debt in a currency over which they have full control. As 
mentioned earlier, the members of a monetary union face the same problem as emerging 
countries that because of underdeveloped domestic financial markets, are forced to issue 
their debt in a foreign currency (see Calvo et al., 2006 and Eichengreen et al., 2005). In the 
words of Eichengreen et al. (2005) this works as the “original sin” that leads these countries 
into a bad equilibrium full of pain and misery.  
There is an additional complication in a monetary union. This is that in such a union 
financial markets become highly integrated. This also implies that government bonds of 
member countries are held throughout the union. According to the BIS data, for many 
eurozone member countries more than half of government bonds are held outside the 
country of issue. Thus when a bad equilibrium is forced on some member countries, 
financial markets and banking sectors in other countries enjoying a good equilibrium are 
also affected (see Azerki et al., 2011) who find strong spillover effects in the eurozone).  
These externalities are a strong force of instability that can only be overcome by government 
action. I will return to this issue when I analyze the governance question of the eurozone. 
To wrap up the previous discussion: members of monetary union are sensitive to 
movements of distrust that have self-fulfilling properties and that can lead them to be 
pushed into a bad equilibrium. The latter arises because distrust can set in motion a devilish 
interaction between liquidity and solvency crises. Being pushed into a bad equilibrium has 
two further consequences. I analyze these in the following section. 
4.  The bad news about a bad equilibrium 
There are two features of a bad equilibrium that are worth analyzing further. First, domestic 
banks are affected by the bad equilibrium in different ways. When investors pull out from 
the domestic bond market, the interest rate on government bonds increases. Since the 
domestic banks are usually the main investors in the domestic sovereign bond market, this THE GOVERNANCE OF A FRAGILE EUROZONE | 7 
 
shows up as significant losses on their balance sheets. In addition, domestic banks are caught 
up in a funding problem. As argued earlier, domestic liquidity dries up (the money stock 
declines) making it difficult for the domestic banks to rollover their deposits, except by 
paying prohibitive interest rates. Thus the sovereign debt crisis spills over into a domestic 
banking crisis, even if the domestic banks were sound to start with. This feature has played 
an important role in the case of Greece and Portugal where the sovereign debt crisis has led 
to a full-blown banking crisis. In the case of Ireland, there was a banking problem prior to 
the sovereign debt crisis (which in fact triggered the sovereign debt crisis). The latter, 
however, intensified the banking crisis.  
Second, once in a bad equilibrium, members of monetary union find it very difficult to use 
automatic budget stabilizers: A recession leads to higher government budget deficits; this in 
turn leads to distrust of markets in the capacity of governments to service their future debt, 
triggering a liquidity and solvency crisis; the latter then forces them to institute austerity 
programs in the midst of a recession. In the stand-alone country (UK) this does not happen 
because the distrust generated by higher budget deficit triggers a stabilizing mechanism.  
Thus, member countries of a monetary union are downgraded to the status of emerging 
economies, which find it difficult if not impossible to use budgetary policies to stabilize the 
business cycle. This feature has been shown to produce pronounced booms and busts in 
emerging economies (see Eichengreen et al., 2005).  
This feature of a monetary union makes it potentially very costly. The automatic stabilizers 
in the government budget constitute an important social achievement in the developed 
world as they soften the pain for many people created by the booms and busts in capitalist 
societies. If a monetary union has the implication of destroying these automatic stabilizers, it 
is unclear whether the social and political basis for such a union can be maintained. It is 
therefore important to design a governance structure that maintains these automatic 
stabilizers.  
5.  Competitiveness and sovereign debt 
The previous analysis allows us to connect sovereign debt dynamics and competitiveness 
problems.  
It is now widely recognized that one of the fundamental imbalances in the eurozone is the 
increased divergence in competitive positions of the members of the eurozone since 2000. 
The phenomenon is shown in figure 5, which I am confident most readers must have seen 
somewhere. One may criticize this figure because of the choice of 2000 as the base year. 
Indeed, this choice assumes that in 2000 there were no imbalances in competitive positions, 
so that any movement away from the 2000-level is a departure from equilibrium and thus 
problematic. This is surely not the case (see Alcidi & Gros, 2010). A number of countries may 
have been far from equilibrium in 2000 so that movements observed since that date could 
conceivably be movements towards equilibrium. In order to take this criticism into account I 
present relative unit labour costs of the member countries using the long-term average over 
the period 1970-2010 as the base. The results are shown in figure 6. The divergence is less 
spectacular, but still very significant. Figure 7 confirms this: the standard deviation of the 
yearly indices increased significantly since 1999. 
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Figure 5. Relative unit labour costs in the eurozone 
 
 Source: European Commission, Ameco. 
Figure 6. Relative unit labour costs in the eurozone  
 
 Source: European Commission, Ameco. 
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Figure 7. Standard deviation relative unit labour costs in the eurozone (per cent)  
 
Note: Computed using data of Figure 6. 
 
The countries that lost competitiveness from 1999 to 2008 (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland) 
have to start improving it. Given the impossibility of using a devaluation of the currency, an 
internal devaluation must be engineered, i.e. wages and prices must be brought down 
relative to those of the competitors. This can only be achieved by deflationary 
macroeconomic policies (mainly budgetary policies). Inevitably, this will first lead to a 
recession and thus (through the operation of the automatic stabilizers) to increases in budget 
deficits.  
Most of the analyses in textbooks now stop by noting that this is a slow and painful process. 
The analysis of the previous sections, however, allows us to go a little further and to link it 
with the debt dynamics described earlier. As countries experience increasing budget deficits 
while they attempt to improve their competitiveness, financial markets are likely to get 
nervous. Distrust may install itself. If strong enough, the latter may lead to a liquidity crisis 
as described before. This then inevitably triggers a solvency crisis. 
Thus the period during which countries try to improve their competitiveness is likely to be 
painful and turbulent: Painful, because of the recession and the ensuing increase in 
unemployment; turbulent, because during the adjustment period, the county can be hit by a 
sovereign debt and banking crises. If the latter occur, the deflationary spiral is bound to be 
intensified. For in that case the domestic long term interest rate increases dramatically, 
forcing the authorities to apply even more budgetary austerity, which in turn leads to an 
even more intense recession. The banks that are trapped in a funding crisis reduce their 
credit to the economy. The country finds itself stuck in a bad equilibrium, characterized by 
austerity programs that fail to reduce budget deficits because they lead to a downward 
economic spiral and punishing interest rate levels. The path towards recovery for members 
of a monetary union is likely to be crisis-prone. 
The contrast with stand-alone countries that have the capacity to issue debt in their own 
currency is stark. When these countries have lost competitiveness, they will typically try to 
restore it by allowing the currency to drop in the foreign exchange market. This makes it 
possible not only to avoid deflation, but also to avoid a sovereign debt crisis. As we have 
seen earlier, these countries’ g o v e r n m e n t s  c a n n o t  b e  f o r c e d  into default by triggering a 
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liquidity crisis. What is more the whole adjustment process involving currency depreciation 
is likely to boost output and inflation, thereby improving the solvency of the sovereign.  
6.  Governance issues 
The debt crisis has forced European leaders to set up new institutions capable of dealing 
with the crisis. The most spectacular response has been the creation of the European 
Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSF) in May 2010 to be transformed into a permanent 
European rescue fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) from 2013 on. Surely these 
were important steps that were necessary to maintain the stability of the eurozone. 
Yet the opposition against these decisions continues to be high especially in Northern 
European countries. Opposition is also strong among economists of these countries (see the 
statement of 189 German economists warning about future calamities if the EFSF were to be 
made permanent, Plenum der Ökonomen, 2011).  
This opposition is based on an incomplete diagnosis of the sovereign debt problem in the 
eurozone. For the 189 German economists the story is simple: some countries (Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) have misbehaved. Their governments have irresponsibly spent 
too much, producing unsustainable debt levels. They are now insolvent through their own 
mistakes. There is no point in providing financial assistance because this does not make them 
solvent. It only gives them incentives to persevere in irresponsible behaviour (moral hazard). 
Thus in this diagnostics, the problem is a debt crisis of a limited number of individual 
countries, that can only be solved by an orderly debt default mechanism. The latter is crucial 
to avoid that German taxpayers have to foot the bill. 
While this analysis may be correct in the case of Greece, it fails to understand the nature of 
the debt crisis in other eurozone countries, because it treats the debt problem as a series of 
individual problems; not as the outcome of a systemic problem in the eurozone, which I have 
described earlier. This systemic problem has several ingredients. First, by acquiring the 
status of emerging countries, the sovereigns of the member states in a monetary union 
become vulnerable, as unfavourable market sentiments can force them into default. This has 
the effect of pushing the country into a bad equilibrium, characterized by punishingly high 
interest rates, chronically high budget deficits, low growth and a domestic banking crisis. 
Second, the degree of financial integration in the monetary union is such that when some 
sovereigns are pushed in a bad equilibrium, this affects the other countries. In particular it 
makes the banking systems in these other countries more fragile. Thus, strong externalities 
are created, making it impossible to isolate a financial problem of one country from the rest 
of the eurozone. Put differently, when one country experiences a debt problem, this becomes 
a problem of the whole eurozone. It is my contention that the governance structure that is 
now being designed does not sufficiently take into account the systemic nature of the debt 
problem.  
7.  What kind of governance? 
I identified two problems of a monetary union that require government action. First, there is 
a coordination failure. Financial markets can drive countries into a bad equilibrium that is 
the result of a self-fulfilling mechanism. This coordination failure can in principle be solved 
by collective action aimed at steering countries towards a good equilibrium. Second, the 
eurozone creates externalities (mainly through contagion). Like with all externalities, 
government action must consist in internalizing these.  THE GOVERNANCE OF A FRAGILE EUROZONE | 11 
 
Collective action and internalization can be taken at two levels. One is at the level of the 
central banks; the other at the level of the government budgets.  
Liquidity crises are avoided in stand-alone countries that issue debt in their own currencies 
mainly because the central bank can be forced to provide all the necessary liquidity to the 
sovereign. This outcome can also be achieved in a monetary union if the common central 
bank is willing to buy the different sovereigns’ debt. In fact this is what happened in the 
eurozone during the debt crisis. The ECB bought government bonds of distressed member-
countries, either directly, or indirectly by the fact that it accepted these bonds as collateral in 
its support of the banks from the same distressed countries. In doing so, the ECB 
rechanneled liquidity to countries hit by a liquidity crisis, and prevented the centrifugal 
forces created by financial markets from breaking up the eurozone. It was the right policy for 
a central bank whose raison d’être is to preserve the monetary union. Yet, the ECB has been 
severely criticized for saving the eurozone in this way. This criticism, which shows a blatant 
incomprehension of the fundamentals of a monetary union, has been powerful enough to 
convince the ECB that it should not be involved in such liquidity operations, and that instead 
the liquidity support must be done by other institutions, in particular a European Monetary 
Fund. I return to this issue in the next section. 
Collective action and internalization can also be taken at the budgetary level. Ideally, a 
budgetary union is the instrument of collective action and internalization. By consolidating 
(centralizing) national government budgets into one central budget a mechanism of 
automatic transfers can be organized. Such a mechanism works as an insurance mechanism 
transferring resources to the country hit by a negative economic shock. In addition, such a 
consolidation creates a common fiscal authority that can issue debt in a currency under the 
control of that authority. In so doing, it protects the member states from being forced into 
default by financial markets. It also protects the monetary union from the centrifugal forces 
that financial markets can exert on the union.  
This solution of the systemic problem of the eurozone requires a far-reaching degree of 
political union. Economists have stressed that such a political union will be necessary to 
sustain the monetary union in the long run (see European Commission, 1977) and De 
Grauwe, 1992). It is clear, however, that there is no willingness in Europe today to 
significantly increase the degree of political union. This unwillingness to go in the direction 
of more political union will continue to make the eurozone a fragile construction.  
This does not mean, however, that one should despair. We can move forward by taking 
small steps. Such a strategy of small steps not only allows us to solve the most immediate 
problems. It also signals the seriousness of European policy-makers in moving forward in 
the direction of more political union.  
8.  A strategy of small steps 
I distinguish between three steps that each requires institutional changes. Some of these 
steps have already been taken. Unfortunately, as I will argue they have been loaded with 
features that threaten to undermine their effectiveness 
8.1  A European Monetary Fund 
An important step was taken in May 2010 when the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) was instituted. The latter will be transformed into a permanent fund, the European 
Stabilization Mechanism (ESM), which will obtain funding from the participating countries 
and will provide loans to countries in difficulties. Thus, a European Monetary Fund will be 
in existence, as was first proposed by Gros & Mayer (2010).  12 |  PAUL DE GRAUWE 
 
It is essential that the ESM take a more intelligent approach to lending to distressed countries 
than the EFSF has been doing up to now. The interest rate applied by the EFSF in the Irish 
rescue program amounts to almost 6%. This high interest rate has a very unfortunate effect. 
First, by charging this high interest rate it makes it more difficult for the Irish government to 
reduce its budget deficit and to slow down debt accumulation. Second, by charging a risk 
premium of about 3% above the risk free rate that the German, Dutch and Austrian 
governments enjoy, the EFSF signals to the market that there is a significant risk of default, 
and thus that the Irish government may not succeed in putting its budgetary house in order. 
No wonder that financial markets maintain their distrust and also charge a high-risk 
premium. All this, in a self-fulfilling way, increases the risk of default.  
The intelligent approach in financial assistance consists in using a policy of the carrot and the 
stick. The stick is the conditionality, i.e. an austerity package spelled out over a sufficiently 
long period of time, so that economic growth gets a chance. Without economic growth debt 
burdens cannot decline. The carrot is a concessional interest rate that makes it easier for the 
country concerned to stop debt accumulation. A low interest rate also expresses trust in the 
success of the package; trust that financial markets need in order to induce them to buy the 
government debt at a reasonable interest rate. Unfortunately, the future ESM will apply an 
interest rate that is 200 basis points above its funding rate. There is no good reason for the 
ESM to do this. By applying such a risk premium, the ESM will signal to the market that is 
does not truly believe in the success of its own lending programme.  
There are other features of the ESM that will undermine its capacity to stabilize the sovereign 
bond markets in the eurozone. From 2013 on, all members of the eurozone will be obliged to 
introduce “collective actions clauses” when they issue new government bonds. The practical 
implication of this is the following. When in the future, a government of the eurozone turns 
to the ESM to obtain funding, private bondholders may be asked to share in the 
restructuring of the debt. Put differently, they may be asked to take some of the losses. This 
may seem to be a good decision. Bondholders will be forced to think twice when they invest 
in government bonds, as these bonds may not be as secure as they thought.  
The intention may be good; the effect will be negative (see De Grauwe, 2010). In fact we have 
already seen the effects. When the German government made the first proposal to introduce 
collective action clauses at the European Council meeting of October 2010, the immediate 
effect was to intensify the crisis in the eurozone sovereign bond markets. I show evidence for 
this in Figure 8, which presents the government bond spreads of a number of eurozone 
countries. It can be seen that immediately after the European Council meeting of October 28-
29, when the first announcement was made to attach collective action clauses (CACs) to 
future government bond issues, the government bond spreads of Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
shot up almost immediately. Since then these spreads have remained high. This contrasts 
with the previous European Council meetings, which either did not seem to affect the 
spreads, or as in the case of the May 2010 meeting was followed by a (temporary) decline in 
the spreads.  
  
Figure 8
Source: D
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turn to the ESM they will be obliged to follow pro-cyclical budgetary policies, i.e. to reduce 
spending and increase taxes. A sure way to make the recession worse. 
The pro-cyclicality of government budgets is an important achievement in the developed 
world. It has led to greater business cycle stability and to greater social welfare, shielding 
people from the harshness of booms and busts in capitalist systems. The way the ESM has 
been set up, however, risks undermining this achievement.  
All this is quite unfortunate. Especially because the existence of a financial support 
mechanism in the eurozone is a great idea and a significant step forwards in the building of 
an integrated Europe (Peirce et al., 2011). Unfortunately, by introducing all kinds of 
restrictions and conditions, the ESM has been transformed into an institution that is unlikely 
to produce more stability in the eurozone.  
8.2  Joint issue of Eurobonds 
A second step towards political union and thus towards strengthening the eurozone consists 
in the joint issue of Eurobonds. A joint issue of Eurobonds is an important mechanism of 
internalizing the externalities in the eurozone that I identified earlier. 
By jointly issuing Eurobonds, the participating countries become jointly liable for the debt 
they have issued together. This is a very visible and constraining commitment that will 
convince the markets that member countries are serious about the future of the euro (see 
Verhofstadt, 2009, Juncker & Tremonti, 2010). In addition, by pooling the issue of 
government bonds, the member countries protect themselves against the destabilizing 
liquidity crises that arise form their inability to control the currency in which their debt is 
issued. A common bond issue does not suffer from this problem.  
The proposal of issuing common Eurobonds has met stiff resistance in a number of countries 
(see Issing, 2010). This resistance is understandable. A common Eurobond creates a number 
of serious problems that have to be addressed.  
A first problem is moral hazard. The common Eurobond issue contains an implicit insurance 
for the participating countries. Since countries are collectively responsible for the joint debt 
issue, an incentive is created for countries to rely on this implicit insurance and to issue too 
much debt. This creates a lot of resistance in the other countries that behave responsibly. It is 
unlikely that these countries will be willing to step into a common Eurobond issue unless 
this moral hazard risk is resolved.  
A second problem (not unrelated to the previous one) arises because some countries like 
Germany, Finland and the Netherlands today profit from triple A ratings allowing them to 
obtain the best possible borrowing conditions. The question arises of what the benefits can be 
for these countries. Indeed, it is not inconceivable that by joining a common bond 
mechanism that will include other countries enjoying less favourable credit ratings, countries 
like Germany, Finland and the Netherlands may actually have to pay a higher interest rate 
on their debt. 
These objections are serious. They can be addressed by a careful design of the common 
Eurobond mechanism. The design of the common Eurobonds must be such as to eliminate 
the moral hazard risk and must produce sufficient attractiveness for the countries with 
favourable credit ratings. This can be achieved by working both on the quantities and the 
pricing of the Eurobonds.  
T h u s ,  m y  p r o p o s a l  w o u l d  b e  t o  s e e k  a  c o m b ination of the Eurobond proposal made by 
Bruegel (Delpla & von Weizsäcker, 2010) and the one made by De Grauwe & Moesen (2009). 
It would work as follows. Countries would be able to participate in the joint Eurobond issue THE GOVERNANCE OF A FRAGILE EUROZONE | 15 
 
up to 60% of their GDP, thus creating “blue bonds”. Anything above 60% would have to be 
issued in the national bond markets (“red bonds”). This would create a senior (blue) tranche 
that would enjoy the best possible rating. The junior (red) tranche would face a higher risk 
premium. This existence of this risk premium would create a powerful incentive for the 
governments to reduce their debt levels. In fact, it is likely that the interest rate that countries 
would have to pay on their red bonds would be higher than the interest rate they pay today 
on their total outstanding debt (see Gros, 2010 on this). The reason is that by creating a senior 
tranche, the probability of default on the junior tranche may actually increase. This should 
increase the incentive for countries to limit the red component of their bond issues.  
The Bruegel proposal can be criticized on the following grounds. To the extent that the 
underlying risk of the government bonds is unchanged, restructuring these bonds into 
different tranches does not affect its risk. Thus, if the blue bond carries a lower interest rate, 
the red bond will have a higher interest rate such that the average borrowing cost will be 
exactly the same as when there is only one type of bond (see Gros, 2011). This is an 
application of the Modigliani-Miller theorem which says that the value of a firm is 
unaffected by the way the liabilities of that firm are structured.  
All this is true to the extent that the underlying risk is unchanged. The point, however, is 
that the common bond issue is an instrument to shield countries from being pushed into a 
bad equilibrium. If the common bond issue succeeds in doing so, the underlying risk of the 
bonds of these countries does indeed decline. In that case these countries are able to enjoy a 
lower average borrowing cost. At the same time the marginal borrowing cost is likely to be 
higher than the average. This is exactly what one wants to have: a decline of the average debt 
cost, and an increase in the marginal cost of the debt. The former makes it easier to service 
the debt; the latter provides strong incentives towards reducing the level of the debt. This 
feature is important to reduce the moral hazard risk. 
The second feature of our proposal works on the pricing of the Eurobonds and it follows the 
proposal made by De Grauwe & Moesen (2009). This consists in using different fees for the 
countries participating in the blue bond issue. These fees would be related to the fiscal 
position of the participating countries. Thus, countries with high government debt levels 
would face a higher fee, and countries with lower debt levels would pay a lower fee. In 
practical terms this means that the interest rate paid by each country in the blue bond 
tranche would be different. Fiscally prudent countries would have to pay a somewhat lower 
interest rate than fiscally less prudent countries. This would ensure that the blue bond issue 
would remain attractive for the countries with the best credit rating, thereby giving them an 
incentive to joint the Eurobond mechanism.  
It should be noted that if successful, such a common Eurobond issue would create a large 
new government bond market with a lot of liquidity. This in turn would attract outside 
investors making the euro a reserve currency. As a result the euro would profit from an 
additional premium. It has been estimated that the combined liquidity and reserve currency 
premium enjoyed by the dollar amounts to approximately 50 basis points (Gourinchas & 
Rey, 2007). A similar premium could be enjoyed by the euro. This would make it possible for 
the euro zone countries to lower the average cost of borrowing, very much like the US has 
been able to do. 
8.3  Coordination of economic policies 
A third important step in the process towards political union is to set some constraints on the 
national economic policies of the member states of the eurozone. The fact that while 
monetary policy is fully centralized, the other instruments of economic policies have 
remained firmly in the hands of the national governments is a serious design failure of the 16 |  PAUL DE GRAUWE 
 
eurozone. Ideally, countries should hand over sovereignty over the use of these instruments 
to European institutions. However, the willingness to take such a drastic step towards 
political union is completely absent. Here also small steps should be taken.  
The European Commission has proposed a scoreboard of macroeconomic variables (private 
and public debt, current account imbalances, competitiveness measures, house prices) that 
should be monitored, and that should be used to push countries towards using their 
economic policy instruments so as to create greater convergence in these macroeconomic 
variables. Failure to take action to eliminate these imbalances could trigger a sanctioning 
mechanism very much in the spirit of the sanctioning mechanism of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (European Commission, 2010).  
While an important step forward, this approach is incomplete. National governments have 
relatively little control over many of the macroeconomic variables targeted by the European 
Commission. In fact the evidence we have of the pre-crisis divergence dynamics is that much 
of it was produced by monetary and financial developments over which national 
governments had little control. Local booms and bubbles developed in the periphery of the 
eurozone. These were driven mainly by bank credit expansion. This is vividly shown in 
Figure 9. It is the combination of bubbles (especially in the housing markets) and credit 
expansion that makes bubbles potentially lethal (see Borio, 2003). This has been made vary 
clear by the experience of Spain and Ireland.  
Thus, any policy aimed at stabilizing local economic activity must also be able to control 
local credit creation. It is clear that because the member states of the eurozone have entered a 
monetary union they lack the instruments to deal with this. Put differently, if the movements 
of economic activity are driven by credit-fuelled animal spirits the only instruments that can 
effectively deal with this are monetary instruments. Members of a monetary union, however, 
have relinquished these instruments to the European monetary authorities.  
The next question then becomes: can the European monetary authorities, in particular the 
ECB, help out national governments? We have been told that this is impossible because the 
ECB should only be concerned by system-wide aggregates. It cannot be made responsible for 
national economic conditions. The reason is that it has one objective which is the 
maintenances of price stability in the eurozone as a whole, and because it has only one 
instrument to achieve this goal. 
This I believe is too cheap an answer. The ECB is not only responsible for price stability but 
also for financial stability. The financial crisis that erupted in the eurozone in 2010 had its 
origin in a limited number of countries. It is therefore important that the ECB focuses not 
only on system-wide aggregates but also on what happens in individual countries. Excessive 
bank credit creation in a number of member countries should also appear on the radar screen 
of the ECB in Frankfurt upon which the ECB should act.   
Figure 9
Source: K
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9.  Conclusion 
A monetary union is more than a single currency and one central bank. Countries that join a 
monetary union loose more than an instrument of economic policy (interest rate or exchange 
rate). When entering the monetary union, they loose their capacity to issue debt in a currency 
over which they have full control. As a result, a loss of confidence of investors can in a self-
fulfilling way drive the country into default. This is not so for countries capable of issuing 
debt in their own currency. In these countries the central bank can always provide the 
liquidity to the sovereign to avoid default. This may lead to future inflation, but it shields the 
sovereign from a default forced by the market.  
Thus, member-countries of a monetary union become more vulnerable. Changing market 
sentiments can lead to “sudden stops” in the funding of the government debt, setting in 
motion a devilish interaction between liquidity and solvency crises. There is an important 
further implication of this increased vulnerability. This is that member-countries of a 
monetary union loose much of their capacity to apply counter-cyclical budgetary policies. 
When during a recession the budget deficits increase, this risks creating a loss of confidence 
of investors in the capacity of the sovereign to service the debt. This has the effect of raising 
the interest rate, making the recession worse, and leading to even higher budget deficits. As 
a result, countries in a monetary union can be forced into a bad equilibrium, characterized by 
deflation, high interest rates, high budget deficits and a banking crisis.  
These systemic features of a monetary union have not sufficiently been taken into account in 
the new design of the economic governance of the eurozone. Too much of this new design 
has been influenced by the notion (based on moral hazard thinking) that when a country 
experiences budget deficits and increasing debts, it should be punished by high interest rates 
and tough austerity programs. I have argued that this approach is usually not helpful in 
restoring budgetary balance.  
In addition, a number of features of the design of financial assistance in the eurozone as 
embodied in the ESM, will have the effect of making countries even more sensitive to 
shifting market sentiments. In particular, the ‘collective action clauses’ which will be 
imposed on the future issue of government debt in the eurozone, will increase the 
nervousness of financial markets. With each recession government bondholders, fearing 
haircuts, will run for cover, thereby making a default crisis more likely. All this is likely to 
increase the risk that countries in the eurozone lose their capacity to let the automatic 
stabilizers in the budget play their necessary role of stabilizing the economy.  
A monetary union creates collective problems. When one government faces a debt crisis this 
is likely to lead to major financial repercussions in other member countries. This is so 
because a monetary union leads to intense financial integration. Whether one likes it or not, 
member countries are forced to help each other out. Surely, it is important to provide the 
right incentives for governments so as to avoid profligacy that could lead to a debt crisis. 
Discipline by the threat of punishment is part of such an incentive scheme. I have argued, 
however, that too much importance has been given to punishment and not enough to 
assistance in the new design of financial assistance in the eurozone.  
This excessive emphasis on punishment is also responsible for a refusal to introduce new 
institutions that will protect member countries from the vagaries of financial markets that 
can trap countries into a debt crisis and a bad equilibrium. One such an institution is the 
collective issue of government bonds. I argued that such a common bond issue makes it 
possible to have a collective defence system against the vagaries of euphoria and fears that 
regularly grip financial markets.  THE GOVERNANCE OF A FRAGILE EUROZONE | 19 
 
A monetary union can only function if there is a collective mechanism of mutual support 
and control. Such a collective mechanism exists in a political union. In the absence of a 
political union, the member countries of the eurozone are condemned to fill in the necessary 
pieces of such a collective mechanism. The debt crisis has made it possible to fill in a few of 
these pieces. What has been achieved, however, is still far from sufficient to guarantee the 
survival of the eurozone.  
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Appendix I. A model of good and bad equilibria 
 
In this section I present a very simple model illustrating how multiple equilibria can arise. 
The starting point is that there is a cost and a benefit of defaulting on the debt, and that 
investors take this calculus of the sovereign into account. I will assume that the country 
involved is subject to a shock, which takes the form of a decline in government revenues. The 
latter may be caused by a recession, or a loss of competitiveness. I’ll call this a solvency 
shock. I concentrate first on the benefit side. This is represented in Figure A1. On the 
horizontal axis I show the solvency shock. On the vertical axis I represent the benefit of 
defaulting. There are many ways and degrees of defaulting. To simplify I assume this takes 
the form of a haircut of a fixed percentage. The benefit of defaulting in this way is that the 
government can reduce the interest burden on the outstanding debt. As a result, after the 
default it will have to apply less austerity, i.e. it will have to reduce spending and/or 
increase taxes by less than without the default. Since austerity is politically costly, the 
government profits from the default.  
A major insight of the model is that the benefit of a default depends on whether this default 
is expected or not. I show two curves representing the benefit of a default. BU is the benefit 
of a default that investors do not expect to happen, while BE is the benefit of a default that 
investors expect to happen. Let me first concentrate on the BU curve. It is upward sloping 
because when the solvency shock increases, the benefit of a default for the sovereign goes up. 
The reason is that when the solvency shock is large, i.e. the decline in tax income is large, the 
cost of austerity is substantial. Default then becomes more attractive for the sovereign. I have 
drawn this curve to be non-linear, but this is not essential for the argument. I distinguish 
three factors that affect the position and the steepness of the BU curve:  
•  The initial debt level. The higher is this level, the higher is the benefit of a default. Thus 
with a higher initial debt level the BU curve will rotate upwards. 
•  The efficiency of the tax system. In a country with an inefficient tax system, the 
government cannot easily increase taxation. Thus in such a country the option of 
defaulting becomes more attractive. The BU curve rotates upwards. 
•  The size of the external debt. When external debt takes a large proportion of total debt 
there will be less domestic political resistance against default, making the latter more 
attractive (the BU curve rotates upwards).  
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Figure A1. The benefits of default after a solvency shock 
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I now concentrate on the BE c u r v e .  T h i s  s h o w s  t h e  b e n e f i t of a default when investors 
anticipate such a default. It is located above the BU curve for the following reason. When 
investors expect a default, they will sell government bonds. As a result, the interest rate on 
government bonds increases. This raises the government budget deficit requiring a more 
intense austerity program of spending cuts and tax hikes. Thus, default becomes more 
attractive. For every solvency shock, the benefits of default will now be higher than they 
were when the default was not anticipated.  
I now introduce the cost side of the default. The cost of a default arises from the fact that, 
when defaulting, the government suffers a loss of reputation. This loss of reputation will 
make it difficult for the government to borrow in the future. I will make the simplifying 
assumption that this is a fixed cost. I now obtain Figure A2 where I present the fixed cost (C) 
with the benefit curves.  
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Figure A2. Cost and benefits of default after a solvency shock 
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I now have the tools to analyze the equilibrium of the model. I will distinguish between three 
types of solvency shocks, a small one, an intermediate one, and a large one. Take a small 
solvency shock: this is a shock S < S1 (This could be the shocks that Germany and the 
Netherlands experienced during the debt crisis). For this small shock the cost of a default is 
always larger than the benefits (both of an expected and an unexpected default). Thus the 
government will not want to default. When expectations are rational investors will not 
expect a default. As a result, a no-default equilibrium can be sustained.  
Let us now analyze a large solvency shock. This is one for which S > S2. (This could be the 
shock experienced by Greece). For all these large shocks we observe that the cost of a default 
is always smaller than the benefits (both of an expected and an unexpected default). Thus the 
government will want to default. In a rational expectations framework, investors will 
anticipate this. As a result, a default is inevitable.  
I now turn to the intermediate case: S1 < S < S2. (This could be the shocks that Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain experienced). For these intermediate shocks I obtain an indeterminacy, 
i.e. two equilibria are possible. Which one will prevail only depends on what is expected. To 
see this, suppose the solvency shock is S’ (see Figure A3). In this case there are two potential 
equilibria, D and N. Take point D. In this case investors expect a default (D is located on the 
BE line). This has the effect of making the benefit of a default larger than the cost C. Thus, the 
government will default. D is an equilibrium that is consistent with expectations.  
But point N is an equally good candidate to be an equilibrium point. In N, investors do not 
expect a default (N is on the BU line). As a result, the benefit of a default is lower than the 
cost. Thus the government will not default. It follows that N is also an equilibrium point that 
is consistent with expectations.  
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Figure A3. Good and bad equilibria 
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Thus we obtain two possible equilibria, a bad one (D) that leads to default, a good one (N) 
that does not lead to default. Both are equally possible. The selection of one of these two 
points only depends on what investors expect. If the latter expect a default, there will be one; 
if they do not expect a default there will be none. This remarkable result is due to the self-
fulfilling nature of expectations. 
Since there is a lot of uncertainty about the likelihood of default, and since investors have 
very little scientific foundation to calculate probabilities of default (there has been none in 
Western Europe in the last 60 years), expectations are likely to be driven mainly by market 
sentiments of optimism and pessimism. Small changes in these market sentiments can lead 
to large movements from one type of equilibrium to another.  
The possibility of multiple equilibria is unlikely to occur when the country is a stand-alone 
country, i.e. when it can issue sovereign debt in its own currency. This makes it possible for 
the country to always avoid outright default because the central bank can be forced to 
provide all the liquidity that is necessary to avoid such an outcome. This has the effect that 
there is only one benefit curve. In this case the government can still decide to default (if the 
solvency shock is large enough). But the country cannot be forced to do so by the whim of 
market expectations.  
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